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ON CLIMACUS’S “AGAINST REASON” THESIS:
A CHALLENGE TO WESTPHAL
Eleanor Helms

I object to Merold Westphal’s characterization in Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith
(2014) of faith as “against reason.” I argue that Kierkegaard scholars emphasize the tension between faith and reason more than Kierkegaard does,
affirming and perpetuating a broader antagonism in our own cultural climate. I suggest that the view of faith as “transforming vision” developed by
M. Jamie Ferreira and others makes better sense of the different facets of faith
pointed out by Westphal and the strengths of his account (especially faith as a
passion) while avoiding conceptual and practical problems with the account
Westphal has recently offered.

Introduction
If we know anything about Kierkegaard, it is that for him faith is in some
sense “against reason.” While most scholars do not consider Kierkegaard
to be a fideist or irrationalist,1 there remains significant disagreement as
to what exactly that means. Merold Westphal’s recent book Kierkegaard’s
Concept of Faith offers a helpful overview of some of these disagreements,
but in the end, I argue, comes down too strongly on the side of faith
being “against reason.” I show more generally that Kierkegaard scholars
emphasize the tension between “faith and reason” more than Kierkegaard does, and I suggest moreover that this undue emphasis has the
unfortunate result of affirming and perpetuating a broader antagonism
between Christianity and academia in our own cultural climate. Framing
Kierkegaard’s concept of faith as “against reason” both misrepresents
Kierkegaard and offers the wrong kind of guidance in our current social
context. I propose that the view of faith as “transforming vision” developed by Jamie Ferreira, Rick Furtak, Patrick Stokes, and others (or what I
will call the “Vision Model”), makes sense of the different facets of faith
pointed out by Westphal and the strengths of his account (especially faith
as a passion) while avoiding both the interpretive and practical problems
with Westphal’s recent account.

1
See for example the collection of essays in Kierkegaard after MacIntyre, especially Davenport, “The Meaning of Kierkegaard’s Choice,” 75–112.
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Reason and Understanding in
Kierkegaard Scholarship and Early Translations
In Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, Westphal offers twelve different aspects
or characteristics of faith. This multifaceted approach enables Westphal
to follow different themes through Kierkegaard’s work. He also recognizes the importance of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms, associating each
aspect with one primary pseudonym (Johannes de Silentio, Johannes
Climacus, or Anti-Climacus). Through these different discussions, one
theme to which Westphal returns at several points is the relationship between faith and reason and the extent to which they are opposed or can
be reconciled.
I take Westphal’s view to be that faith and reason are not essentially opposed; however, his claims are ambiguous in several ways. Westphal first
attributes an “‘against reason’ thesis” to Climacus before going on to offer
nuance as to what such a thesis could mean.2 He plays up the thesis in several ways, including in chapter titles: we consider faith as the “Teleological
Suspension of Reason” in chapter 5 and as a “Striving Pathos That Goes
against Reason” in chapter 11. At the same time, Westphal cautions that
“we should not latch onto just any possible meaning of the phrase ‘against
reason’ and attribute it to Climacus.”3 Westphal then goes on to say that
Climacus is likely challenging the Platonic epistemology of recollection4
as well as the Platonic ontology according to which time and eternity are
logically exclusive,5 in contrast with Climacus’s claim that they are a synthesis for the self. Christianity would be irrational according to such an
ontology, but of course it is not the only possible or logically defensible
one. (In fact, Hegel argues for such a synthesis.) Elsewhere, Climacus
complains that “speculative philosophy” does not dispute Christianity
but rather explains away its central paradox (i.e., eternity entering time).6
Perhaps surprisingly, however, Climacus does not use the phrase
“against reason” at all, either in Philosophical Fragments or Concluding Unscientific Postscript, as I discuss further below.7 In mitigating the possible
ways in which such a thesis might be misunderstood, Westphal is solving a
problem he is at the same time helping to create—that is, the mistaken view
that faith is obviously “against reason” for Climacus and all that remains
for scholars to do is determine exactly what he means by this controversial
claim. Where does the idea of an “against reason” thesis come from?

Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 224.
Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 224.
4
Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 225.
5
Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 226.
6
Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 212, 214.
7
All textual counts here are based on searching the digital texts supplied by the Soren
Kierkegaard Center at http://teol.ku.dk/skc/english/. Many thanks for the many individuals
at the SKC who have worked to make these online texts freely available.
2
3
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Climacus does use the phrase “against understanding [Forstand]”
quite often, as I discuss below. As Westphal rightly observes, however,
“understanding” and “reason” are distinct powers for Hegel,8 as they
are for Kant. “Understanding” is the way in which minds conceptualize
and give structure to the world as it appears; “reason” is more speculative, going beyond what appears (at least for Kant) to ideas such as the
self, God, and the universe, which can never appear in experience.9 For
Hegel, reason is likewise holistic: the totality of being and becoming
are united as Spirit and made explicit.10 For both philosophers, reason
resolves dialectical tensions that arise at the level of understanding. For
Kant, reason resolves the transcendental dialectic of the antinomies by
recognizing that the universe is an idea of reason, not an object of possible experience (i.e., of understanding).11 For Hegel, contradictions at the
level of perception and understanding are resolved in a higher synthesis
of reason as self-consciousness and unity.12 While I do not propose that
Kierkegaard agrees with Kant and Hegel on exactly these points, it would
have been odd for Kierkegaard to expect people familiar with Kant and
Hegel to hear the phrase “against understanding” as a critique of reason
in the transcendental (and quite technical) Kantian and Hegelian sense.
While Kierkegaard may not be maintaining the same technical distinction
(perhaps using “understanding” more loosely to mean “common sense
understanding”), it is odd to then also treat the generic phrasing as inclusive of specific transcendental accounts, in which reason is very unlike our
“common sense understanding.”13 Yet Westphal insists that Kierkegaard
includes all these types of reason (put forward by Spinoza, Kant, and
Hegel).14
So what exactly does Kierkegaard mean to include by the phrase
“against understanding” when it appears in various works? This question
arises already at the level of translation, and decisions by early translators may have influenced the perspective of contemporary commentators.
Andrew Burgess has provided a valuable overview of correspondence
between Walter Swenson and David Lowrie on their disagreement over
the term Forstand. Lowrie, noting the Hegelian distinction above, preferred
to translate Fornuft as “reason” (like the German Vernuft) and Forstand as
Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 132–133, 242.
Kant, “Third Part,” Prolegomena, 65.
10
Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 482–483; para. 794. See also Westphal’s discussion of
Hegel, Philosophy of Religion, at 132–133, especially 3:261.
11
Kant, “Third Part,” Prolegomena, §§50, 74.
12
“For knowing is itself the movement of these abstract moments, it is the universal self,
the self of itself as well as of the object and, as universal, is the self-returning unity of this
movement.” (Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, para. 583, 356)
13
In fact, Kierkegaard sometimes uses it positively, for example when he writes that “to
understand and to understand are two different things” (Concept of Anxiety, 142; cited in
Gouwens, “Imagination in Repetition,” 287).
14
Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 20–25.
8
9
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“understanding” (like the German Verstand).15 Swenson argued instead that
dividing the terms risks communicating (mistakenly, Swenson thought)
that some type of reason is not affected by the Absolute Paradox.16 Burgess
sums up the disagreement well:
Lowrie prefers the term “understanding,” because that usage leaves room
for someone to think there is another higher principle, the reason; while
Swenson insists on the term “reason,” precisely in order to prevent anyone
from thinking in this way.17

Part of Swenson’s argument is that there is no consistent distinction
in everyday Danish between “reason” and “understanding,” just as there
is none in English.18 Lowrie asks in reply: “Why is it that S. K. does not
use the words interchangeably, but (in the contexts we are interested in)
uses exclusively Forstand?”19 Burgess then observes that Swenson never
replies directly to this question of why Kierkegaard so privileges just one
term.20 How consistent is Kierkegaard on his use of these terms? The term
Forstand appears 1,344 times in Kierkegaard’s published writings. Fornuft,
by contrast, appears only 7 times.21 If this is simply a matter of equivalence
and convenience (as it is more common in English to say “I understand
X” than to say “I reason X”) then we should find the same relative proportions in scholarship and commentaries. In fact, what we do find is an
inversion, with scholars and commentators showing a marked preference for “reason” and Fornuft over “understanding” and Forstand, even
in commentaries on texts where these terms are not used at all, such as
Philosophical Fragments and Sickness unto Death. In searchable Danish commentaries at the Søren Kierkegaard Research Center, the term Forstand
appears 504 times (fewer times than Kierkegaard), while the term Fornuft
appears 122 times (much more often than Kierkegaard). If the terms are
equivalent within each language, why is Fornuft (reason) used disproportionately by scholars, in preference to the term Kierkegaard actually uses,
which is almost always Forstand (understanding)?
As already suggested, English-speaking Kierkegaard scholars do this
as well, though it is more difficult to document quantitatively. What we
do readily find are examples of commentators glossing a quote in which
Kierkegaard uses the term “understanding” as a broad stroke against

15
Andrew Burgess, “Forstand,” 112, citing Walter Lowrie, correspondence, Univ. of Minn.
#33, Princeton #30.
16
Burgess, “Forstand,” 113, citing Swenson, Something About Kierkegaard, 219–220.
17
Burgess, “Forstand,” 113.
18
Burgess, “Forstand,” 113, citing Swenson, Something About Kierkegaard, 218–219.
19
Burgess, “Forstand,” 114, Walter Lowrie, Swenson-Lowrie correspondence, Univ. of
Minn. #45, Princeton #41.
20
Burgess, “Forstand,” 115.
21
Forstand appears an additional 1,259 times in unpublished writings, including journals,
papers, and letters. Fornuft appears an additional 48 times in other writings.
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reason in general.22 C. Stephen Evans, who has knowledge of the SwensonLowrie debate and history, explicitly does so to make an interpretive point
(that is, to show his support for Swenson’s decision). Here the translation preference is not merely a point of linguistic usage (e.g., that there
is no difference in spoken Danish usage between the terms) but explicitly
a philosophical one. That is, his use of the term is an expression of his
agreement with Swenson that Kierkegaard’s critiques apply to all types of
reasoning, as he explains in a footnote in Passionate Reason.23 Such decisions
by established scholars have meant, unfortunately, that readers of the early
Swenson-Lowrie translation of Philosophical Fragments as well as readers of
contemporary secondary sources in English will come away with the idea
that Kierkegaard frequently uses both terms and varies their context. Beyond foiling the basic goal of textual accuracy, conflating and even inverting
the terms has two more significant consequences I will develop here. First,
it undermines the claim, accepted by many scholars (including Westphal,
I believe), that faith and reason are not essentially opposed. Regularly
referring to “reason” rather than “understanding” in contexts in which
Kierkegaard emphasizes some kind of opposition with faith will make
the kinds of reconciliations and refutations of irrationalism, even those
proposed by commentators like Westphal, difficult to fill out consistently
(as I discuss further below). Second, changing Kierkegaard’s terminology
makes it harder to (re-)introduce the technical Kantian-Idealist notion of
transcendental reason into our contemporary conversations about faith,
even though it is needed for reasons I will elaborate below. In my discussion, I will focus my discussion on Westphal’s book Kierkegaard’s Concept of
22
In Karen Carr’s conclusion to “The Offense of Reason,” for example, she ends by treating
“reason” as synonymous with logical inference (249) and with a quote on “crucifixion of the
understanding” (quoting Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 559). See Carr, “The Offense of
Reason” and Carr, “After Paganism”; see also Buben, “Neither Irrationalist nor Apologist,”
319. Buben uncritically adopts language from Evans, citing passages on “understanding” in
support of Evans’s broader claim about “reason,” even though Buben ultimately objects to
Evans’s conclusion. Moreover, both “reason” and “understanding” are regularly reduced
to the concrete situation of “having reasons or evidence,” so that the issue becomes the
question of the role of apologetics (cf. Evans, Passionate Reason, 164-65, and Buben, “Neither
Irrationalist nor Apologist,” 321, 324). For an in-depth discussion of his view on the relationship between faith and reason (and a defense of “against reason” language), see Evans,
Faith Beyond Reason, 93–113. He concludes that reason is essentially concrete (a set of norms
for reasoning that are socially acceptable) (94–96), which is of course quite different from
the Kantian transcendental view. In fact, Evans explicitly argues that Kierkegaard can reject
“concrete reason” without challenging “ideal reason” (94), which seems to me very much in
line with the Kantian view properly understood.
23
Evans agrees with Swenson that the Kantian-Hegelian distinction is not relevant. He
argues that Philosophical Fragments as a whole “leaves no doubt that Climacus thinks that
human beings are completely unable to comprehend the paradox of the incarnation. It was in
fact to preclude this misinterpretation that David Swenson originally translated Forstanden
as ‘the reason.’ To signify my own agreement with Swenson on this point, I shall talk interchangeably about reason or understanding in discussing these issues” (Evans, Passionate
Reason, 188n7). It is noteworthy here that, like Swenson, Evans makes his choice here in order
to affirm a particular interpretation, without claiming that Kierkegaard himself uses them
interchangeably.
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Faith, but I will also provide examples from other Kierkegaard scholars of
the same kind of conflation and inversion of terms. I take Westphal’s usage
to be a particularly clear and well-developed representation of a larger
trend in Kierkegaard scholarship toward treating different kinds of cognitive activities all under one generic name “reason.”24
Reason or Claims about Reason?
The central question is whether faith and reason are essentially (i.e., necessarily) opposed, and if they are, what the “reason” that faith opposes is
supposed to be. Westphal’s overall conclusion is that faith and reason are
not essentially opposed. I take it that this is Westphal’s overall conclusion
even though he at times directly states the opposite. For example, Westphal
calls Socrates “an analog of the Christian faith that goes not merely beyond
but against reason.”25 On the other hand, he also writes, “Abraham’s faith is
unreasonable—madness, absurd, paradox—not intrinsically but relatively,
that is, only in relation to some interpretation of reason or understanding
from which some essential of biblical faith has been excluded a priori.”26
Here Westphal treats the terms “reason” as equivalent to “understanding”
as he does throughout Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith (as well as to other
terms such as “human wisdom”).27 The difficulties come when Westphal
begins to spell out the way in which faith and reason are only relatively opposed, and to do so his definition of reason must evolve. Westphal initially
defines reason as “the exercise of the human intellect unaided.”28 But this
definition on its own says nothing about the intellect’s assessment of its
own abilities (i.e., whether it recognizes any need for revelation or excludes
biblical faith “a priori”). Introducing the claim that faith is “against” reason
requires Westphal to supplement this initial definition: reason is not just
human power unaided but “the human power to understand everything
and leave no mysteries unresolved.”29 “Reason” now comes to mean not
just an activity but a claim about the scope of that activity. Faith is not
against reason or human power per se, he clarifies, but rather “particular,
substantive, metaphysical” claims about what reason can accomplish (that
is, its claim to be absolute).30 But this means that the “‘against reason’
thesis” is really an “‘against some claims about reason’ thesis.”
24
Evans offers some clarifications in Faith Beyond Reason, 94, such as the distinction between “concrete” and “ideal” reason (see n. 22 above). But Evans goes on to make what
would be category mistakes (from a Kantian-idealist perspective) by describing reason itself
as selfish and prideful. From a Kantian point of view, this is like describing mathematics as
prideful or sinful, whereas surely it is only persons (e.g., mathematicians) to whom moral
qualifications can meaningfully be applied.
25
Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 224 (emphasis mine); see also 199.
26
Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 100.
27
Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 225.
28
Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 83.
29
Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 86.
30
Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 227.
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Further complicating the relationship between faith and reason,
Westphal later adds an additional qualification: “If in faith one goes beyond these modes of reason, it will not be to abandon or abolish them but
to suspend them teleologically in something taken to be higher and more
inclusive.”31 To which definition of reason does teleological suspension
apply? Surely unjustified claims about reason (e.g., its potential to leave
“no mysteries unresolved”32) should be rejected once and for all, not just
suspended. And human power unaided (the initial definition, without
any claims about its scope) does not need to be “suspended” so much as
appropriately restricted, again once and for all. So we actually need a third
definition of reason to make sense of the claim of teleological suspension.
It turns out that “reason” in this context actually means “the historically
contingent perspective of a society,” i.e., “the ethical,” or Sittlichkeit.33 This
(obviously quite different) third definition sits easily with the others only
because it happens to converge with the second definition in the Enlightenment: the historically-contingent perspective of an Enlightenment-style
society includes particular, substantive claims about the sufficiency of
reason. By now we have gotten well beyond ordinary English or Danish
uses of the term “reason” (or Fornuft), and likewise well beyond Swenson’s
initial arguments to Lowrie for translating “understanding” as “reason.”
Westphal instead now emphasizes Kierkegaard’s direct engagement with
Hegel, where the term “reason” is invoked alongside other technical terms
such as “speculation” and “system,” while at the same time being nevertheless broad enough to include Kant and Spinoza as part of a generic
“religion of reason.”34 Yet—like Swenson—while embracing the technical
application to Hegel, Westphal resists aligning the terms with Hegel’s own
(more limited) usage. Westphal—like Evans—insists that Kierkegaard’s
critique is aimed at concrete or situated reason, and yet wants to draw a
conclusion about transcendental reason as well.35
The term “reason” cannot mean all these things at the same time. It
cannot at once be generic (all attempts to leave no mystery) and also
technical (addressing Hegel’s transcendental system in particular), an
epistemological error to be rejected and also restored through teleological
suspension, absolute and also culturally situated. Most importantly, I see
little justification for using a loaded, technical term like “reason” for this
third sense, to mean something more like “being understood by one’s culture.” This third sense may often have little to do with logic or rational
thought in a philosophical sense (much less reason in the transcendental
sense used by Kant and Hegel). In the special case of the Enlightenment, as
I have pointed out, two logically distinct things converge: (1) “reason” in
Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 227.
Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 86.
33
Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 169.
34
Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 22, 132–133.
35
See Evans, Faith Beyond Reason, 94, 96.
31
32
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its transcendental sense and (2) “reason” as historically-conditioned social
or cultural expectation. In the Enlightenment—and in Kierkegaard’s Denmark—the historical time period (cultural expectation) just so happened
to care a lot about transcendental reason and made bold claims about
what it could accomplish. Westphal’s insistence that all of these are simply
“reason” conflates these important distinctions.
We’re indebted to Westphal for putting forward the idea of historical or
situated reason at all. Westphal has argued that when Silentio in Fear and
Trembling talks about a teleological suspension of “the ethical,” he does
not mean a suspension of moral goodness but something more like social
context. On the other hand, if the “reason” that is teleologically suspended
in faith does mean something more like Sittlichkeit, or common social understanding, there is no need to also reject (or even suspend) reason in its
transcendental sense. Westphal nevertheless at times plays up a conflict
between faith and reason in general without adding such qualifications.
It would help avoid even initial confusions, for example, to replace the
chapter title “Faith as a Striving Pathos That Goes against Reason” (chapter
11) with “Faith as a Striving Pathos That Goes against Social Norms,”
and “Faith as the Teleological Suspension of Reason” (chapter 5) with
“Faith as the Teleological Suspension of Culture.” Doing so would affirm
the conflict between faith and reason as historically contingent (cultural
reason) rather than necessary (transcendental reason), if this is Westphal’s
ultimate conclusion. Even the phrase “against understanding” feels less
loaded, more inclusive of Westphal’s actual conclusions and of the focus
of Fear and Trembling, which is Abraham’s inability to give an account of
himself to others. Since “understanding” [Forstand] is a term that does appear in Fear and Trembling and the Postscript, and points more clearly to
problems of communication and cultural acceptance (not logic),36 why not
use it consistently—even exclusively—in commentaries on these works?37
Here Swenson’s other philosophical and theological reasons emerge as
bearing all the remaining weight: even if Kierkegaard is himself ambiguous
or prefers “understanding,” choosing to translate Forstand as “reason” allows the translator to reinforce a particular, substantive claim: no part of
human thinking is untouched by the paradox. Using the term “reason”
also allows Westphal to emphasize the ways in which Kierkegaard challenges Enlightenment-style thinking broadly understood: Hegel, Kant,
Plato, and even Aquinas, as well as contemporary views. (Westphal
mentions positivism and the dominance of natural science.38) But this is
again an attempt to have two contradictory things. Either Kierkegaard
is criticizing contingent social norms about transcendental reason that
turn out to be wrong, or the paradox (and faith) are contrary to reason
See especially Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 565.
By contrast, Westphal proposes “Faith is incommensurable with reason” as one of Kierkegaard’s “theses” (Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 61).
38
Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 225.
36
37
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in its transcendental sense. Philosophers have made a variety of claims
about transcendental reason, as Westphal notes.39 And it may well be that
Kierkegaard disagrees with all of them—Aquinas through Hegel—on
the relationship of faith to reason. Even so, Kierkegaard joins this debate
as a philosopher—in fact retrieving Kant’s reservations, contra Hegel,
about the sense in which to know a boundary is already to transcend it,
as Westphal himself has argued.40 If so, these are “claims about reason1”
vs. “claims about reason2”—two varieties of historical (cultural) reason—
not “reason (in general) vs. faith.” Westphal points out such differences
among Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel but takes Kierkegaard to be somehow
above the fray.41
Is there any sense in which a conflict between faith and reason is strictly
necessary (i.e., logically essential), according to Westphal? Is there a way,
in other words, in which faith and transcendental reason conflict? Westphal
includes a quote from Evans that apparently embraces the ambiguity:
Insofar as God transcends the social order, and insofar as the social order attempts to deify itself and usurp divine authority, there is a necessary opposition between faith and “reason,” just as there is a tension between faith and
what in Fear and Trembling is called “the ethical.”42

Evans could mean that, since the social order does necessarily deify itself,
there is a necessary tension between it and reason. Or, he could mean the
exact opposite: faith and reason are not necessarily in tension, but only insofar as the social order attempts to deify itself, which it does not inherently
do but—as it turns out—often does.
Here again, much of the problem—the need to find just the right thing
to say about reason—is self-inflicted. In the passage just quoted, “reason”
and “the ethical” are in quotation marks, presumably because they do not
refer to reason or ethics in a strict sense but rather to some historical (cultural) claims about reason. But it becomes easy to now treat these terms
(and the connection between them) as if they belong to Silentio. On the
above passage from Evans, for example, Westphal writes: “Silentio insists
that, while the knight of faith has gone beyond ‘reason’ and ‘the ethical,’
he does so only ‘after’ having been immersed in them and without abandoning them.”43 Saying that “Silentio insists” any of this is misleading: the
analogy between reason and the ethical is made by Evans, not Silentio.
Like Climacus, Silentio never uses the term “reason” [Fornuft] at all.44 Here
39
Westphal proposes reasons, reasonk, and reasonh to describe the different views of
reason in Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel (Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 21).
40
See Westphal, “In Defense of the Thing in Itself,” esp. 134–141.
41
Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 21.
42
Evans, “Faith as the Telos of Morality,” 24, quoted in Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of
Faith, 100 (emphasis mine.)
43
Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 101.
44
Similarly, Westphal writes: “Silentio does make explicit that this does not invalidate
the ethical universal but only relativizes it, and that for faith it is the relation to God that
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again, Westphal and Evans first do significant work to exaggerate the tension before adding nuance, while nevertheless trying to have it both ways
when a decision is clearly called for: Is the “reason” Silentio is concerned
with here a contingent, Enlightenment claim we can discard (and/or teleologically suspend), or is it an essential feature of how human thinking
(necessarily) works, i.e., something transcendental we cannot logically (or
teleologically) abandon?
I will not argue here for either of these theses. My wider observation—
and I think the culturally more important one—is that we as scholars
place undue emphasis on Kierkegaard’s challenges to reason while in the
end offering little concrete insight into exactly how far such challenges
extend. We will make more progress, I suggest, if we discard the presumption of an opposition between faith and reason. This presumption is
both cultural, as I will show below, and philosophical, in the sense that it
has become traditional to frame reason as autonomous and revelation as
a source of alterity (a dichotomy which would have been nonsensical to
earlier philosophers like Augustine and Aquinas). One strain in Kierkegaard scholarship that does not force this opposition is the view of faith as
transfiguring vision, or what I will call the “Vision Model,” as put forward
by Jamie Ferreira and others. In the last section, I will examine the cases
in which Kierkegaard does use the term Fornuft (“reason”) and argue that
the Vision Model makes better sense of these examples in context.
Vision and Fornuft
What about the times Kierkegaard does discuss “reason” [Fornuft] itself?
There are so few instances it is easy to address them individually. They
do not suggest any kind of “against reason” thesis or even a sustained
critique of reason. A few of them do suggest, however, an emphasis on
new ways of seeing, as I will elaborate.
Several uses of the term Fornuft come in the course of general summary
or paraphrase of someone else’s view. For example, in Johannes Climacus,
or de omnibus dubitandum est, Climacus writes: “Therefore, it is really
interesting to see how Hegel wishes to formulate the transition from consciousness to self-consciousness, from self-consciousness to reason. When
the transition consists merely of a heading, it is easy enough.”45 Again discussing other thinkers, Vigilius Haufniensis writes in Concept of Anxiety:
“Usually immediacy is posited in opposition to reflection (inwardness)
and then the synthesis (or substantiality, subjectivity, identity, that in
governs our relation to society, whereas for reason, at least in its distinctive modern forms, it
is the other way around” (Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 96), implying that Silentio
“explicitly” says this about reason and its similarity to the ethical. These shortcuts become
sedimented: in the index of Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, for example, one finds “as stockbroker of the finite” under the heading “reason,” when in Fear and Trembling it is a reference
to “the understanding” (91). The entry “Understanding” in the index to Kierkegaard’s Concept
of Faith refers the reader to the entries for Hegel and defines “Understanding” as Vorstellung.
Westphal also treats “reason” as equivalent to “human wisdom” more generally (225).
45
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which this identity is said to consist: reason, idea, spirit).”46 In Concluding
Unscientific Postscript, the term appears as part of a humorous story. In
the same spirit, Climacus adds the story of “Hilarius, Executioner,” who
has lost his son, and says, “Take heart, reason, he lives!” as if “reason” (in
general) needs comfort.”47
Of the four remaining uses of the term “reason” [Fornuft], two are qualified by “human.” In Works of Love Kierkegaard writes:
When Christianity came into the world, it did not itself need to point out
(even though it did so) that it was contending with human reason, because
the world discovered this easily enough. But now, now when Christianity
for centuries has lived in protracted association with human reason, now
when a fallen Christianity (just like those fallen angels who married mortal women) has married human reason, now when Christianity and reason
have a Du relationship—now Christianity must above all itself pay attention
to the obstacle.48

In Practice in Christianity, Anti-Climacus writes: “But what is the offense,
that which offends? That which conflicts with all (human) reason.”49 But
this usage no more justifies an “‘against reason’ thesis” than Anti-Climacus’s
claim that “human compassion is a miserable invention that is cruel where
the greatest need is to be compassionate and is compassionate only where
in the truest sense it is not compassion!”50 constitutes an “‘against compassion’ thesis.”51 Just as “human compassion” is not true compassion, “human
reason” is not true reason.52
In one of the remaining examples, from Stages on Life’s Way, “reason”
seems to be used in the sense of reflection (of the kind criticized in Two
Ages):
Wenn in kleinen Städten ein Selbstmord vorfällt, wie lange wird nicht darüber
gesprochen, wie viel wird nicht darüber vernüftelt [When a suicide occurs in
small towns, how long one talks on and on about it, how much one reasons
and palavers]! (However, I believe that one is through with it more quickly
than if one were to introduce reason into this wisdom. Poor Paris!)53

Concept of Anxiety, 142; IV 408 / SKS 4, 442.
Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 514n / SKS 7, 466.
48
Works of Love, 199 / SKS 9, 189.
49
Practice in Christianity, 26; XII 25 / SKS 12, 40–41.
50
Practice in Christianity, 17.
51
“But it must be remembered that with regard to differences in life everyone wants to
cling to his own; it is because of this fixed point, this consideration, that human compassion
is always merely to a certain degree. Sausage peddlers will consider that in being compassionate it is descending too far down to go to paupers in the poorhouse and express equality
with them; the compassion of sausage peddlers is trapped in one consideration [Hensyn],
consideration for other sausage peddlers and then for saloon keepers. Thus this compassion
is not totally reckless [hensynløs]” (Practice in Christianity, 59).
52
Westphal emphasizes the importance of the qualifier “human” for “human reason” in
the opening of Kant’s First Critique (Westphal, “In Defense of the Thing in Itself,” 118, 136).
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Stages on Life’s Way, “Letters to the Reader,” §6, 480n / SKS 6, 44.
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But here there is no indication that Kierkegaard (or the pseudonym,
Hilarius Bookbinder) intends a far-reaching critique of reason in general
rather than simple over-reflection or calculation. It is clear in context,
moreover, that the term “wisdom” is being used sarcastically.
The last example, from “The Tax Collector,” in fact more directly supports the Vision Model—namely, faith as a kind of sight, a transforming
vision, as developed by Ferreira.
He cast his eyes down, but the downcast gaze sees God, and the downcast
gaze is the uplifting of the heart. Indeed, no gaze is as sharp-sighted as that
of faith, and yet faith, humanly speaking, is blind; reason, understanding, is,
humanly speaking, sighted, but faith is against the understanding.54

While faith and reason are indeed opposed in this passage (and reason is,
moreover, treated as equivalent to understanding), they are also presented
as different kinds of activities or a turning of attention in different directions. Significantly, both reason and faith are described as a kind of sight. In
another passage as well, cited by Westphal in support of a tension between
faith and reason, it is actually a new kind of sight that is being emphasized.
For example, framing a quote from “A Sermon” by Kierkegaard,55 Westphal
says the following: “Where ‘reason’ claims autonomy and self-sufficiency
for itself, it will find divine revelation to be ‘unreasonable’.”56 Like the passage in Without Authority, this discussion is actually about vision:
The glory of which we are speaking was certainly not very acceptable to the
earthly eye, since it was a stumbling-block to the Jews and foolishness to the
Greeks. The eye which saw it, therefore, was not the earthly eye, but the eye
of faith, which confidently peered through the terror in order to see what no
earthly eye can discover if he who gazes is ignorant of what there is to see.57

The emphasis here is much more on recognition and anticipation rather
than “reason” in any traditional philosophical (much less transcendental)
sense.
Such passages more obviously support the Vision Model of faith as put
forward by Jamie Ferreira, Rick Furtak, and Patrick Stokes. For Ferreira,
the decision or appropriation of faith is best described as a paradigm shift,
or what she calls “an imaginative transition which is a reorienting, transforming shift in perspective.”58 Drawing on the writings of Henry David
Thoreau, Rick Furtak adds that even ordinary visual perception is always a
matter of appropriation and receptivity. According to Thoreau, the “objects
which one person will see from a particular hilltop are just as different
“The Tax Collector,” Without Authority, 132 / SKS 11, 268).
Collected in Johannes Climacus.
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from those which another will see as the persons are different,” since things
are concealed from us “not so much because they are out of the course of
our visual ray as because we do not bring our minds and eyes to bear on
them.”59 Patrick Stokes develops a concept of moral “interest” [inter-esse]
based on implicit self-awareness that enables one to locate oneself as an
individual in relation to the world as it is perceived.60 None of these accounts pits reason or understanding against faith. They instead view faith
as a mode of understanding reality and one’s place in it.
Faith and Reason in American Christendom
I agree with Westphal’s overall claim: Enlightenment thinkers such as
Hegel and Lessing argued that religion could be replaced by rational education and that reason is in some sense higher than faith, and Kierkegaard
disagreed. Westphal (along with Evans and others) has brought subtle and
illuminating attention to this difference over the course of many years. But
Climacus’s critiques of Hegel and Lessing regarding understanding are very
specific, targeting some aspects of some forms of German Idealism while
accepting and presuming others (such as dialectic). These specialized critiques do not necessarily imply, in other words, that faith is against reason
in general, or “the reflectively organized common sense of mankind,” as
Swenson argues.61 The reverse is also true: revelation may challenge our
common sense cultural understandings without challenging all types of
transcendental reason. (Kierkegaard could challenge Hegel while agreeing
with much of Kant, for example.) In this case, unfortunately, it also turns
out that scholars who side with Swenson are quick to import a preoccupation of our own culture (let’s call it “American Christendom”), which is all
too comfortable with a “faith vs. reason” paradigm. In the section below,
I lay out some ways in which the “faith vs. reason” dichotomy plays out
in our own cultural context and explain why American Christendom—
our Sittlichkeit—needs the Kantian transcendental view of reason as a
corrective.
Alan Jacobs recently argued in Harper’s Magazine (September 2016)
that Christian intellectuals have largely retreated from the public sphere.
Whether or not we agree with his claim, it is hard to imagine such an essay
being written in Kierkegaard’s time. Earlier in 2016, Nicholas Kristoff
wrote in The New York Times about George Yancy, a sociologist who stated
he faces more discrimination as an evangelical in academics than as a black
man outside it.62 In this time of “fundamentalist extremism,” “intellectual
elitism,” “science denial,” and “secular” more often than not prefacing
Thoreau, “Autumnal Tints,” 393, cited in Furtak, “Skepticism and Perceptual Faith,” 529.
Stokes, “Kierkegaard’s Mirrors,” 89. See also Stokes, Kierkegaard’s Mirrors.
61
Burgess, “Forstand,” 115, citing Swenson, Something About Kierkegaard, 99–100.
62
Cf. Kristoff, “A Confession of Liberal Intolerance.” About George Yancy, a sociologist
who is both black and evangelical, he writes: “’Outside of academia I faced more problems
as a black,’ he told me. ‘But inside academia I face more problems as a Christian, and it is
not even close.’”
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“academy” in everyday conversation, we expect a daily showdown of religion against reason in the public sphere. A reader approaching Westphal’s
book with these cultural prejudices—historically contingent, substantive
beliefs about faith and reason—will too readily find confirmation that
faith and reason are “ill wed,” as Westphal describes them.63
In Kierkegaard’s time, playing up the ways in which faith is “against
understanding” was a corrective for an age influenced by Christian Hegelians. Our age is different. Anyone who has taught Jean-Paul Sartre’s
“Existentialism is a Humanism” recently knows how students love Sartre
with the deep love sophomores have for someone telling them what they
already think. The essay affirms for them that (1) reason is limited, (2)
nevertheless, decisive actions are required, and (3) such actions constitute
our identities. Many college students—religious, atheistic, and (relative)
bystanders—presume that faith is in conflict with reason (both logic and
science), that life is about authentic, decisive, identity-constituting action in
practical contexts, and at the same time that most human so-called knowledge is perspectival, cultural, and ultimately pragmatic. Can it be that our
culture at large, led by our college students, has absorbed Kierkegaard’s
dialectical wisdom? I doubt it. But as a result of such cultural changes,
the oppositional framework that Westphal, Evans, and others continue to
reinforce fails to act as a cultural corrective—a voice from elsewhere—in
the ways they hope.
Moreover, they have rejected in advance some of the philosophical
resources that can play such a corrective role. For example, Westphal
challenges the dominance of natural science.64 One effective way to do
this in our time, contrary to Westphal’s emphasis, is by teaching and understanding Kant’s claims about the limits of objective knowledge and
scientific observation. Religious students as well as atheists have all been
told from their respective sub-cultures that religion and science are at
odds. In the 2014 film God’s Not Dead, for example, heavily advertised by
Christianbooks.com (whose tagline “Everything Christian for less!” cries
desperately for Kierkegaard’s satirical touch), a Christian student enrolls
in a philosophy class and is immediately asked to write “God is dead”
on a sheet of paper and sign his name to it. The Christian student refuses
(the only one in a class of about 85 to do so), sparking a class debate over
the existence of God that lasts until the end of the film. The film closes
with a scrolling list of real-life Academia vs. Christianity court cases. Students raised in the Christendom of films like this one expect a showdown
between reason and faith. Non-religious and atheistic students likewise
expect “reason” (science, logic, and common sense) to present a unified
front against “faith,” the stubborn outsider. They do not expect an intramural debate about knowledge between reason and science. Playing faith
against reason discourages us from examining philosophically (that is,
63
64

Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 133, 182.
Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 225.

CLIMACUS’S “AGAINST REASON” THESIS: A CHALLENGE TO WESTPHAL 485

intramurally) what reason is and from distinguishing between different
types of reason, as well as its social standing in our culture. My concerns
here are both conceptual and practical: I have a philosophical concern to
preserve or restore the conceptual subtlety of nineteenth-century reason
in its transcendental, Kantian sense, in contrast with pure logic, conceptual understanding, and scientific observation, as I have discussed above; I
also have a practical, pastoral concern about encouraging the pre-existing
tendency of American Christians to treat reason and its university guardians with suspicion, as exemplified in the film.65 I find Kierkegaard to be
quite subtle on this point, critiquing “calculation” and “probability” but
accepting other more sophisticated kinds of knowledge (as developed by
Ferreira, Furtak, and Stokes, for example). We can accept these insights
without claiming that reason can substitute for or replace revelation and
faith, but it is difficult to do so if we reduce rich philosophical discussions of reason (in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, for example)
to mere common sense and cultural norms.
Lastly, playing faith against reason, including by drawing lines of
demarcation to separate their domains, diminishes our ability to form
any “concept” of faith, Kierkegaardian or otherwise, by emptying the
proposed alternatives of meaningful content. On the “leap,” for example,
Westphal writes: “Cognition provides no bridge; a decision to act is
needed.”66 What does a “decision to act” mean? Is it the result of deliberation? Westphal references Aristotle’s practical syllogism.67 But a practical
syllogism is hardly beyond or against reason. All means-ends reasoning,
for Aristotle as well as for Kant, entails a decision to act in reality and to
treat reasons or facts, as Stokes puts it, as “claiming” us.68 How is faith
different from Aristotelian or Kantian practical reason on Westphal’s
view? Moreover, action in response to testimony and authority would be
rational according to many philosophers.69 How is religious faith unique?
Westphal claims that one insight Kierkegaard appreciates from Lessing is
that even “cognitive” leaps cannot be made cognitively.70 Does it all come
down to personal appropriation?71 If so, is such appropriation arbitrary, or
is it based on something?
65
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Ferreira’s Vision Model answers these questions by including decisive
action as an essential component of faith without asking it to carry the
burden of being faith. The model of “transforming vision” accounts for the
cognitive and existential shifts in the same movement. Ferreira writes the
following:
When what is seen is not a neutral possibility laid out before one, but a possibility recognized and appreciated as a “task,” the relation between imagination and choice can no longer be the simplistic one in which imagination
first lays out options and then we shut our eyes and hold our breath and
“will” one.72

A new “seeing-as,” for Ferreira, is often multi-leveled and complex, invoking the will at the same time as the perceptual recognition, but without
faith simply being a response of the will.73 Westphal rightly emphasizes,
for example, that “the joy of knowing that one is related to an eternal
happiness is dialectically inseparable from the suffering entailed in that
relation.”74 This is so because the peculiar kind of joy received in suffering is joy in consciousness75—a new way of seeing one’s suffering. Yet
here again, Westphal turns the suffering of guilt into a tension “between
faith and reason or understanding.”76 This addendum is not required or
implied in the context of Climacus’s discussion. It leads us to see ourselves
as mainly engaged in an ongoing battle against the Enlightenment rather
than—at least on this point—as joined in wonder with these thinkers
(and Kierkegaard among them) at the paradoxicality of consciousness
and the richness of its objects,77 with new and higher pleasures offered
to the rare Christian trained in philosophy and German Idealism who,
like Kierkegaard, understands just how deep all this can go. Falling back
instead on the familiar “faith vs. reason” dichotomy serves mainly to confirm the direction our culture at large is heading on its own, without any
help from Kierkegaard.
No model of faith is likely to be the whole story. Westphal rightly emphasizes that Kierkegaard employs multiple pseudonyms in part in order
to let each voice be one-sided.78 Kierkegaard writes, “Nothing is easier
for the one providing the corrective than to add the other side: but then
it ceases to be precisely the corrective and itself becomes an established
order.”79 At the same time, this means that readers of Kierkegaard should
72
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recognize, perhaps more than anyone else, that being a cultural corrective
will not mean pushing in the same direction always and for all time. My
hope is that we will not overlook resources in Kierkegaard’s thought that
do not fit comfortably with the ways we have become used to thinking,
including the familiar ways of classifying philosophers in our Western
cultural heritage. For us, here and now, the Kantian and Hegelian distinctions among different types of reason are so far from being the established
order that they have now become a corrective.80
California Polytechnic State University
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